Containment by Design

A friend called last week with a familiar complaint. He had built his workload inside AWS Nitro Enclaves, and he wanted out. His words, not mine: “Pretty easy to get in. Pretty costly to get up. Impossible to get out.” A friendly onboarding pipeline had generated his key for him and left it sitting right there in the console, and he honestly could not tell you whether it was his to take somewhere else. AWS ran the attestation. AWS decided, on every request, whether his own code was allowed to touch his own secrets. Then he asked the question that started this article. How do I port this to another provider? ...

In September 2006, a Debian maintainer did everything right and broke the world’s trust for a year and a half. He was cleaning up the OpenSSL package. Valgrind and Purify, the memory checkers every careful engineer is supposed to listen to, kept flagging two lines in md_rand.c. The lines read uninitialized memory. That’s a sin. Undefined behavior, the kind of thing you delete without a second thought. So he deleted it. ...

It was around 2000. I was running Legion across entire Class B ranges, watching open Windows shares scroll up the screen faster than I could read them. C$. ADMIN$. Whole NT4 boxes answering null sessions like a door with no lock and a welcome mat on the floor. You didn’t need a password. You needed curiosity and a free afternoon. The Microsoft of that era had no Patch Tuesday. No Security Response Center worth the name. Security was a feature request that lost to the ship date, every quarter, on purpose. The company that today runs one of the most disciplined vulnerability programs on the planet once shipped operating systems to hospitals and banks with the equivalent of the front door propped open. ...

Last Friday, the White House ordered every federal agency to stop using Anthropic products within six months. The Defense Secretary designated the company a “supply chain risk to national security” — a label normally reserved for foreign adversaries like Huawei or Kaspersky. Anthropic’s crime: they refused to remove two safety guardrails from Claude before deploying it on classified Pentagon networks. No AI for mass domestic surveillance of American citizens. No fully autonomous weapons without human oversight. ...

In Brazil, when advising a customer on endpoint security, there was a mental model we never said out loud. The technical discussion would cover detection rates, false positives, memory footprint — the usual. But underneath it ran a question that never made it into the RFP: who do you want knowing what you’re doing? Russians or Americans? Kaspersky was the default for most of the market — and not because of ideology. Norton and Symantec had spent years earning their reputation for turning Windows machines into molasses, and McAfee was McAfee. Kaspersky worked. It was lighter, faster, cheaper. The fact that its telemetry flowed to Moscow rather than Langley was a feature, not a bug, depending on which side of the table you sat on. ...

This is the third and final part of a series based on a real-world engagement: a company that scaled from $40M to $1B in annual revenue in just five years, and the security program that had to grow with it. This is a story about building high-performance operating systems where security, standards, architecture, and performance act as enablers rather than constraints. Part 1: Earning credibility before you’ve earned authority. Part 2: Blurring the lines — Security at the SRE and Operations level. Part 3: Wrapping the gift — Transparency and agency. The Quality That Can’t Be Purchased I’ve been writing around this idea for a while — in Cold Aisle Trenches, in why standards fail when you try to impose them, in how defense in depth actually works at scale. The thread is always the same: security can’t be bought. You can’t swipe a credit card and receive “secure” in a box. It’s a quality that emerges — like the lights-out data center you don’t chase but eventually arrive at, because every other piece fell into place first. ...

This is the second of a three-part series based on a real-world engagement: a company that scaled from $40M to $1B in annual revenue in just five years, and the security program that had to grow with it. This is a story about building high-performance operating systems where security, standards, architecture, and performance act as enablers rather than constraints. Part 1: Earning credibility before you’ve earned authority. Part 2: Blurring the lines - Security at the SRE and Operations level. Part 3: Wrapping the gift — Transparency and agency. From Trust to Reliance ...

This is the first of a three-part series based on a real-world engagement: a company that scaled from $40M to $1B in annual revenue in just five years, and the security program that had to grow with it. This is a story about building high-performance operating systems where security, standards, architecture, and performance act as enablers rather than constraints. Part 1: Earning credibility before you’ve earned authority. Part 2: Blurring the lines - Security at the SRE and Operations level. Part 3: Wrapping the gift — Transparency and agency. The Inflection Point A few years back, AMTI was at the heart of a fascinating corporate challenge. I was serving as a fractional CISO and advisor for a company standing at a critical inflection point. ...

A bricked storage array, a 2+4 SLA that technically performed, and a technician asking about lunch while executives circled. We learned that risk transfer is an illusion when your blood is on the floor. January 2026 · Stefano Schotten The contract was honored. The business still bled. My case manager called me from the customer site. I could hear the tension before he said a word. “The VPs are pacing. Four of them, maybe five. They’re all just… standing around IT, watching.” ...

It was 2017. We had just deployed an additional ScaleIO cluster to handle the onboarding of a new customer with hundreds of VMs. Eight nodes, each with 40 Gbps at the backend. Beautiful. Efficient. The whole rack was a work of art—Dell R740s with MD1220 expansions, bezels removed so you could see all those drives blinking in perfect synchronization. The cluster was deployed less than two weeks ago. I told the customer to “burn it.” ...

A few months ago I read Project Hail Mary and found myself thinking about observation and agency. Einstein didn’t “invent” spacetime dilation—he created the conditions to perceive it. Without the means to observe, you’re just touching walls in complete darkness. Trial and error, yes, but you never truly know the depth of what you’re sensing. Saturday mornings I take my son to flag football. He’s been in martial arts for half his life—his coach loves his resilience. But something surfaced in team sports that doesn’t appear on the mat. ...

In 2015, I did what seemed like the mature thing to do. I created a Production Engineering department. My college foundation was production engineering. I was a true believer: if we formalized standards and assigned a dedicated group to own operational rigor, the organization would naturally converge toward consistency. The mandate: Create SOPs. Define standards. Reduce variance. Improve reliability. On paper, it was textbook. In practice, it was a slow-motion collision with reality. ...